Functionalism vs. Philosophical Behaviourism

Attribute	Functionalism	Philosophical Behaviourism
Key Figures	Putnam, Fodor	Watson, Skinner
Focus	Mental states and their functions	Observable behavior
Approach	Computational theory of mind	Stimulus-response associations
Explanation of Mind	Mind as a computational system	Mind as behavior
Reductionism	Non-reductive	Reductive

Introduction

Functionalism and Philosophical Behaviourism are two prominent schools of thought in the field of philosophy of mind. While both theories attempt to explain the nature of mental states and processes, they differ in their approach and key concepts. In this article, we will compare the attributes of Functionalism and Philosophical Behaviourism to highlight their similarities and differences.

Functionalism

Functionalism is a theory that focuses on the functions and roles of mental states rather than their physical properties. According to functionalists, mental states are defined by their causal relations to other mental states, sensory inputs, and behavioral outputs. In other words, what matters is not what a mental state is made of, but what it does and how it interacts with other mental states. This approach allows for the possibility of multiple physical realizations of the same mental state, known as multiple realizability.

• Focuses on functions and roles of mental states
• Defines mental states by their causal relations
• Emphasizes multiple realizability

Philosophical Behaviourism

Philosophical Behaviourism, on the other hand, is a theory that focuses on observable behaviors as the primary indicators of mental states. According to behaviourists, mental states are nothing more than dispositions to behave in certain ways in response to stimuli. This means that mental states can be fully understood and explained in terms of external, observable behaviors without reference to internal mental processes. Behaviourism rejects the idea of private mental states that are inaccessible to external observation.

• Focuses on observable behaviors
• Defines mental states in terms of dispositions to behave
• Rejects the idea of private mental states

Comparison

While Functionalism and Philosophical Behaviourism differ in their focus and key concepts, they share some similarities in their approach to understanding mental states. Both theories reject the idea of identifying mental states solely based on their physical properties and emphasize the importance of looking at the functions and roles of mental states in explaining behavior. Additionally, both Functionalism and Philosophical Behaviourism aim to provide a comprehensive account of mental states that is consistent with empirical evidence and observable phenomena.

One key difference between Functionalism and Philosophical Behaviourism is their treatment of mental states in relation to physical states. Functionalism allows for the possibility of multiple physical realizations of the same mental state, which means that different physical systems can exhibit the same mental functions. This flexibility in the relationship between mental and physical states is a strength of Functionalism, as it accommodates variations in the physical structures that can give rise to mental states.

On the other hand, Philosophical Behaviourism takes a more reductionist approach by equating mental states with observable behaviors. This strict adherence to external manifestations of mental states can be seen as a limitation of Behaviourism, as it may overlook the complexity and richness of internal mental processes that are not directly observable. Behaviourism's focus on behavior also raises questions about how to account for mental states that do not have overt behavioral manifestations.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Functionalism and Philosophical Behaviourism offer distinct perspectives on the nature of mental states and processes. While Functionalism emphasizes the functions and roles of mental states and allows for multiple realizability, Philosophical Behaviourism focuses on observable behaviors as the primary indicators of mental states. Both theories have strengths and limitations in their approach to understanding the mind, and further research and debate are needed to fully explore the implications of these theories for our understanding of consciousness and cognition.